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The November 2004 Hearings of the European Parliament on the Directive on Services (hereafter 
the Directive) offered a fascinating preview of the cur-
rent debate.  It was already dominated by the unholy 
alliance of the supporters of a social model based on 
“public service” tied to public monopolies and narrow 
vested interests based on private monopolies. “Rent-
seekers of all Member States, unite!” could be the ap-
propriate motto.
On the one hand, some testimonies1 compare an 
idealised “European social model” (ignoring its nega-
tive sides in terms of low growth, massive and perma-
nent unemployment and a host of perverse effects 
caused by “good intentions”2 to a demonised market 
economy (ignoring its contribution to faster growth 
and reduced unemployment).  Worrisomely, this unbal-
anced approach (which was largely driving the public 
campaign against the Directive in April and May 2005) 
places the “founding countries” of the European Com-
munity (lavishly granted with the best possible social 
systems in every respect) in opposition to the other EC 
Member States (accused of social dumping and unfair 
competition). Clearly, shifting from 15 to 25 Member 
States is not so much a question of the number of 
countries but is, rather, a profound change in the Com-
munity, torn apart between the Member States reluc-
tant to change and those which have already changed, 
often under harsh pressure from the former.
On the other hand, the power of narrow vested in-
terests and the extreme weakness of some European 
governments is also prevalent in the Hearings. The 
best illustration may be a testimony3 of which half is 
devoted to a plea to exclude French huissiers, notaires 
and avocats près les Cours suprêmes (bailiffs, nota-
ries and barristers to the Supreme Courts) from the 
Directive coverage. Such a focus on three tiny legal 
professions suggests the following quick calculation: 
assuming that the Directive covers half of the French 
GDP, such a focus would be consistent with a govern-
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ment genuinely concerned with public interest if these 
three professions represented a quarter of the French 
GDP ...
Remembering the Past:
 the Logic behind the Directive
The current debate on the Directive largely ignores 
the two long developments in European integration 
which led to the Directive.4 First, the Directive is the 
natural continuation of the Single Market Programme 
(SMP), itself the heir of the Common Market. This is 
best underlined by the fact that the SMP in services 
was launched in 1984-85 by a group of industrialists 
– the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) – 
who did not limit the scope of the EC reforms to be 
undertaken to manufacturing issues, but who included 
the opening to intra-EC competition of key services for 
industry, such as telecommunications and other es-
sential infrastructure services. Second, the Directive 
is largely a “rationalisation” of a long and rich series of 
rulings by the European Court of Justice which started 
with the well-known 1974-79 Dassonville and Cassis 
de Dijon rulings, and which focused on the elimination 
of obstacles to intra-EC trade.
Recognising these two lineages is essential be-
cause it presents the Directive as a logical evolution 
– not a change in course – of European integration 
over the past forty years. It reveals an intrinsic demand 
for the current Directive which will continue to exist 
if the Directive is not adopted. And the rationalisa-
tion generated by the Directive will not really reduce 
the level of legal uncertainty (the Court has been so 
time-consistent in the matters covered that there is lit-
tle doubt about its future rulings) but it will reduce the 
high transaction costs associated with bringing new 
cases to the Court unnecessarily. The “logical” nature 
of the Directive does not mean that the Directive will 
be adopted, or that it will be adopted with changes 
that will not deeply reduce its current scope and 
depth. It means that the failure to adopt the Directive 
in the coming months will unavoidably impose heavy 
costs on the European economies and hence will gen-
erate renewed efforts to get back to the current Direc-
tive – at the Community level or at a plurilateral level in 
the Community.
Indeed, it is interesting to note that the demand for 
such a Directive dates from long before the European 
integration process itself. Ironically, the Directive ech-
oes a well-known French Report – the Rapport Rueff-
Armand on the “obstacles to economic expansion” 
– written in 1959 at the request of General de Gaulle 
before France embarked on European integration. In-
deed, irony almost turns to cruelty: the Rueff-Armand 
Report5 devoted a lot of attention to notaires (again!) 
underlining the inefﬁ ciency of these private monopo-
lies – a point echoed today by the consumers’ asso-
ciation Que Choisir [No. 426, May 2005] which has just 
published an issue on the bad quality of the services 
provided by the notaires. Plus ça change, plus c’est la 
même chose ...
The Three Options for Liberalising 
Intra-EC Cross-border Services
The last two decades have slowly revealed three 
ways to liberalise services. First, there is the option 
of fully harmonising the existing domestic regula-
tions, either by adopting the regulation of one of the 
Member States or by adopting a common regulation 
through negotiations. Adopting the regulation of one 
of the countries is a rare occurrence. It happens when 
the Community fully imposes the acquis communau-
taire on the new Member States. That has happened 
only in a few narrow domains mainly related to trade 
policy. And it did not take long for the Europeans to 
realise that negotiating and adopting a harmonised 
regulation differing from all the existing national ones 
is a very costly endeavour. It is time-consuming (often 
more than ten years for regulations dealing with tiny 
services). It does not necessarily lead to more efﬁ cient 
regulations. It tends to progress on a service by ser
vice basis and hence to distort economic decisions 
(investors are induced to invest (or not) in harmonised 
services as a consequence of the harmonisation proc-
ess, not on purely economic grounds). It is easy to re-
verse because a harmonised regulation can be quickly 
“dis-harmonised” by Member States imposing addi-
tional (peripheral) provisions when implementing the 
new “harmonised” regulation. And last but not least, it 
is often simply impossible.
The second way to liberalise services – opened up 
by the Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon rulings – con-
sists of limiting harmonisation to the “key” provisions 
of the common regulation to be adopted jointly and 
imposing the “mutual recognition” principle for the 
rest of the provisions. This approach is conceptually 
clever. But its effective success depends on the bal-
ance between the harmonisation and mutual recog-
nition parts (a large harmonisation part is equivalent 
5 Rapport sur les obstacles à l’expansion économique (Rapport Rueff-
Armand), Imprimerei nationale, Paris 1960.
4 Patrick M e s s e r l i n : Measuring the Costs of Protection in Europe, 
Institute for International Economics, Washington DC 2001.
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to full harmonisation) and there is a systematic bias 
in this process. As the balance between these two 
parts is generated by negotiations on the provisions 
to be harmonised, there is a systematic drift towards 
expanding the scope of harmonisation and contract-
ing the scope of mutual recognition. This is because 
negotiations often involve a majority of Member 
States fearful or reluctant to liberalise and only a 
handful of Member States convinced of the beneﬁ ts 
of liberalisation.6 Moreover, European decision-mak-
ers have feared that liberalisation in many services 
could lead to a rough and fast shift from monopoly 
to competition because of the large over-capacities 
built up in decades of public “overinvestment” in a 
context of controlled prices, massive subsidies, and 
public monopolies. For instance, in the early 2000s, 
the electricity sector has an estimated average over-
capacity of 20% in almost all the EC countries (up to 
30% in France); retail banking is still provided through 
vastly oversized networks; and the telecom networks 
of railways or electricity public monopolies have been 
hugely oversized (in the mid-1990s, SNCF, the French 
railways company, was reportedly using only 10% of 
its own telecom network capacity).
The last option for liberalising services consists in 
extending the mutual recognition principle to all the 
regulatory provisions – the so-called principle of the 
“country of origin” (hereafter PCO). However, this ap-
proach is often combined with “non-harmonisation” 
commitments by the Member States on some related 
laws, such as labour or social security regulations 
which remain under the control of the host Member 
States.
Why Such an Outcry over the Directive?
The Directive makes signiﬁ cant use of the third op-
tion.  But it is not the ﬁ rst one to do so, and it is far 
from being entirely based on this third option – a situ-
ation which raises the question of the reasons why the 
Directive has been subjected to such an outcry.
First, the Directive has several precedents relying on 
the PCO, the most interesting one being the 1989 and 
1997 Directives on “Television without Frontiers” (TWF) 
and the 2002 Communication on the implementation 
of the 1997 TWF Directive. Both state that foreign TV 
channels follow the regulations of their country of ori-
gin, including regulations concerning quotas. Why did 
the PCO attract almost no attention in such a sensitive 
sector as the audiovisual one? The ﬁ rst (and probably 
the most powerful) reason is that technology makes it 
impossible to reject the PCO – except by completely 
banning foreign TV channels, a measure that could 
be perceived as hurting consumers much more easily 
than prohibiting huissiers or notaires from operating in 
several Member States’ markets. The second reason 
is that major “natural transaction costs” (languages 
and/or tastes) constitute impediments limiting the 
development of cross-border trade. By contrast, such 
natural costs seem absent for services covered by the 
Directive on Services, and the opponents to the Direc-
tive have always developed their arguments in terms 
of ﬁ nal consumers (a horde of Polish tilers invading 
Germany or Polish plumbers invading France).  But 
the Directive is likely to be much more important for 
medium or small enterprises than for large enterprises 
(which have been largely able already to build their 
networks of services providers) or for ﬁ nal consumers 
(for whom the natural costs of hiring a Polish tiler or 
plumber are huge, except in a few border regions).
Second, the Directive on Services is far too wide-
ranging to be based only on the PCO. This is because 
liberalising intra-EC services could be done through 
investment in foreign markets (often called “establish-
ment”) or cross-border trade in services.  In the intra-
EC context, cross-border trade in services can be 
“physical” trade (such as legal advice sent by fax by 
a foreign expert to a domestic operator) or the trading 
of the service through labour (or another factor) move-
ments (such as non-permanent stays of experts from 
a Member State in another Member State). The cur-
rent debate on the Directive focuses on cross-border 
trade (mainly of the second kind) whereas the Directive 
provisions on establishment have been relatively un-
controversial, as illustrated by the fact that they have 
almost escaped the proposal of amendments to the 
European Parliament (amendments are made only at 
the early stage of proposals).
Why is cross-border trade so sensitive and estab-
lishment uncontroversial? First, establishment has 
proved not to be a very pro-competitive strategy in 
services – threatening vested interests much less 
than cross-border trade. When constrained by the 
host country regulations, investors in services from 
other Member States have strong incentives to fol-
low the prevailing behaviour in the market in which 
they have invested (after all, this behaviour has been 
tested by the domestic incumbents as the most proﬁ t-
able one in the legal environment, a conclusion which 
6 For instance, Steil has documented this evolution in the Investment 
Services Directive case. Cf. Ben S t e i l : Regional Financial Market 
Integration: Learning from the European Experience, Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, London 1998.
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has no reason to change since the legal environment 
remains unchanged). In sharp contrast, cross-border 
trade opens the door to more competitive behaviour 
because it generates competition between the regula-
tions in different Member States – hence it puts ﬁ rms 
in contact with different incentives provided by differ-
ent legal environments. This pro-competitive impact of 
cross-border trade exists even if constraints on labour 
movement (or on some other aspects, such as the 
environment) remain, as is the case with the Directive, 
which maintains all the existing Member States’ labour 
laws, be they on minimum wages, work conditions, di-
plomas etc. Even within such limits, freer labour move-
ments are likely to improve resources allocation in 
every Member State. Of course, these improvements 
may be smaller than in the situation where constraints 
from labour laws were relaxed.  But bigger improve-
ments would then be countervailed by larger adjust-
ment costs for workers in the Member States, and the 
current Directive is based on the presumption that the 
net impact of these two aspects would be negative.
The Costs and Beneﬁ ts of the Directive: 
a Few Points
In addition to the above-mentioned reasons, the 
outcry over the Directive also ﬂ ows from the fact that 
it covers a large proportion of services (50 per cent of 
the GDP according to the Commission). Such a wide 
scope has a huge economic beneﬁ t: it minimises the 
distortions which would have been generated by regu-
latory reforms based on a sectoral approach. But it 
has a heavy political cost: it has generated the unholy 
coalition of the few remaining public monopolies and 
a host of tiny, but highly powerful, private monopolies. 
The problem is compounded by the fact that there are 
almost no available evaluations of the costs and ben-
eﬁ ts of alternative solutions to these private monopo-
lies to be shown to the general public. For instance, 
there is no information on the costs and beneﬁ ts of 
the current system of pharmacies (or notaires!), that 
is, on its ability to deliver the expected quality of the 
services at the lowest possible cost and on the ability 
of alternative solutions. Such evaluation studies are 
incorporated in the Directive process, but that is too 
loose and too late.
As a result, most Europeans do not understand that 
the PCO was adopted in the Directive simply because 
the other two options did not work well. Recent re-
search by the OECD Secretariat7 allows us to obtain 
a quantitative assessment of the extent to which the 
SMP has really not bitten so far. Based on an interna-
tional database on the regulations enforced in OECD 
countries, it provides indicators (from least (0) to most 
(6) restrictive) of product market regulation in 30 OECD 
countries for 1998 and 2003.8 Despite its intrinsic 
limits, such an exercise produces two crucial results 
(see Table 1) conﬁ rming earlier observations.9 First, the 
Table 1
Indicators of Product Market Regulation in OECD 
Countries
(0=least restrictive, 6=most restrictive)
Ranking in 1998 Ranking in 2003
Country Indicator Country Indicator
1 UK 1.1 UK 0.9
2 Australia 1.3 Australia 0.9
3 USA 1.3 USA 1.0
4 Canada 1.4 Iceland 1.0
5 New Zealand 1.4 New Zealand 1.1
6 Denmark 1.5 Denmark 1.1
7 Ireland 1.5 Ireland 1.1
8 Iceland 1.6 Canada 1.2
9 Netherlands 1.8 Sweden 1.2
10 Austria 1.8 Japan 1.3
11 Sweden 1.8 Finland 1.3
12 Norway 1.8 Netherlands 1.4
13 Germany 1.9 Austria 1.4
14 Japan 1.9 Germany 1.4
15 EC-15 2.0 Belgium 1.4
16 Belgium 2.1 Slovakia 1.4
17 Finland 2.1 EC-15 1.4
18 Portugal 2.1 Norway 1.5
19 Switzerland 2.2 Korea 1.5
20 Spain 2.3 Portugal 1.6
21 Mexico 2.4 Spain 1.6
22 France 2.5 Switzerland 1.7
23 Hungary 2.5 France 1.7
24 Korea 2.5 Czech Rep. 1.7
25 Greece 2.8 Greece 1.8
26 Italy 2.8 Italy 1.9
27 Czech Rep. 3.0 Hungary 2.0
28 Slovakia 3.0 Mexico 2.2
29 Turkey 3.1 Turkey 2.3
30 Poland 3.9 Poland 2.8
S o u rc e : Paul C o n w a y, Véronique J a n o d  and Guiseppe 
N i c o l e t t i : Product Market Regulations in OECD countries: 1998 to 
2003, OECD Working paper ECO/WKP(2005)6.
7 Paul C o n w a y, Véronique J a n o d  and Giuseppe N i c o l e t t i : Prod-
uct Market Regulation in OECD countries: 1998 to 2003, OECD Work-
ing paper ECO/WKP(2005)6.
8 These indicators focus on products, but they include services, such 
as distribution, covered by the Directive. They are calculated for the 
EC15 Member States plus the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary 
and Poland.
9 Patrick M e s s e r l i n , op. cit.
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EC15 lags behind the non-European OECD Members 
(Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand and 
the USA) as much in 2003 as in 1998, improving its 
relative situation only with respect to Switzerland and 
Norway.  Second, there is no convergence among the 
various EC Member States: some of them still enjoy 
better regulations while the others are still at the bot-
tom of the whole OECD group of countries – suggest-
ing that so far the SMP has had little impact and that 
most services liberalisation has been generated by 
technological progress (starting mostly in telecoms, 
then spreading to telecom-intensive services) or by 
Member States’ own decisions. The only change 
between 1998 and 2003 is the remarkable progress 
made by some new Member States (Slovakia, but not 
Poland, despite the allegations of the opponents of 
the Directive).
The PCO generates regulatory reforms, each Mem-
ber State trying to ensure that its domestic service 
providers would enjoy competitive advantages by 
adopting more efﬁ cient laws and regulations. This 
competition in regulations generates the strong fears 
of a “race to the bottom” in Europe.  These fears are 
based on an analysis of Member States’ fundamental 
behaviour, which ignores the impact of “reputation” 
on the Member States’ decision-making process. 
Member State governments simply cannot afford the 
economic, and hence political, risks of racing to the 
bottom – they will simply lose the next elections. The 
reputation incentive induces governments to design 
competitive regulations not detrimental to “quality” 
(whether the quality of products, services or working 
conditions) and the more countries are democratic, the 
more powerful are such reputation effects.  The race to 
the bottom also conveys implicitly the idea that all the 
Member States will converge to the same (worse) reg-
ulations. This is the opposite of the way competitive 
markets work in modern economies: ﬁ rms compete by 
differentiation of their products or services as much as 
(if not more than) by prices – and modern states tend 
to do the same when designing new regulations.
A Look at the Proposed Amendments and a Final 
Remark
The Rapporteur of the European Parliament has 
proposed a ﬁ rst set of amendments which boils down 
to a return to harmonisation and/or mutual recognition. 
The OECD score reminds us that there is little hope to 
be expected from these approaches. There is even 
less reason for hope than before. Full harmonisation 
will be even more difﬁ cult to achieve in an enlarged 
and more heterogeneous Community than in a smaller 
and more homogeneous Community. The same could 
be said about the mutual recognition approach if it is 
remembered that behind the nice concept of mutual 
recognition there is the tough and dirty work of ne-
gotiating the harmonisation core. The drift towards 
expanding this core to the detriment of the mutual 
recognition part will undoubtedly be much stronger in 
a Community with 25 heterogeneous Member States 
than in a Community with twelve or ﬁ fteen relatively 
similar Member States.
The proposed amendments have two additional 
major ﬂ aws. First, they introduce a host of consid-
erations which mix up resource allocation and the 
distribution of income or rights. Economics is like 
plumbing: each tool is appropriate for speciﬁ c tasks, 
and using the wrong tool is a recipe for disaster. So 
far, the Community has been successful in not mix-
ing up market reforms and distribution regulations. 
The amendments go in the opposite direction. Such a 
messing up will not be sustainable because Member 
States have very different views on distribution (some 
accept more short-term inequality than others). Sec-
ond, the amendments adopt a much more sectoral 
approach.  Looking at the Hearings, there is little hope 
that the parliaments and governments of most of the 
Member States will be able to resist such a fragmenta-
tion of regulatory reforms. The broad coverage of the 
Directive re-established the primacy of governments 
over narrow vested interests. The amendments are 
re-opening the door to the capture of the European 
governments by these narrow vested interests.
Reputation and trust are two related concepts. The 
Directive may have been passed more easily in the 
pre-enlargement Community because trust existed 
between the 15 Member States on the basis of the 
past (all these Member States shared the same his-
tory). The Community with 25 Member States may 
generate a different kind of trust – trust between 
countries sharing the same desire to improve things. 
Such a trust could generate a plurilateral initiative for 
restoring the current Directive, but limited to the Mem-
ber States sharing the same conﬁ dence in the gains 
from regulatory reforms. Such an evolution would be 
ironical: it would resurrect the concept of the “core” 
or the “avant-garde” in European integration, but with 
the opposite membership than the one expected ten 
years ago.
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In a recent speech Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Commission, emphasised the im-
portance of service sectors for European growth as 
they account for almost 70% of jobs and have been 
the major driver for growth and job creation for over 
two decades. Nevertheless, service sectors may have 
been held back by internal market barriers. Cross-bor-
der trade and investments remain at a modest level, 
and intra-EU trade in services has not increased at all 
since 1992. In contrast, intra-EU trade in goods has 
increased by one third and has added 1.8% to the EU 
GDP every year. Mr. Barroso said, “Today, the greatest 
unexploited potential clearly lies in services. If we are 
not able to tap this potential, European workers and 
consumers will be the real losers.”1
The speech related to the discussion on the pro-
posed services directive drafted by Frits Bolkestein 
on behalf of the Commission (January 2004). The ser
vices directive would eliminate internal market barriers 
in order to allow for free establishment and movement 
of services between member states. For the Commis-
sion, the services directive will be a key step in making 
the EU the most dynamic and competitive economy 
in the world by 2010 as targeted in the Lisbon agree-
ment.
The proposed directive has been heavily debated, 
and central in the debate have been the perceived 
economic beneﬁ ts of the directive. In the debate, 
ﬁ gures such as 600 000 new jobs and consumption in-
creases of €37 billion (0.6%) following the implemen-
tation of the directive have frequently been quoted.
The source of these particular ﬁ gures is a recent 
study conducted by Copenhagen Economics ApS2 
which also concludes that new jobs would be created 
in all member states and output would rise in every 
sector. The study is by far the most detailed economic 
analysis of the services sector reform ever. 
The logic behind the results is that lower barri-
ers will bring down operational costs and stimulate 
competition within and between member states. This 
will again lead to lower prices, higher productivity and 
higher wages, all of which will stimulate demand and 
giving rise to a net gain of new jobs, value added and 
consumption. A signiﬁ cant result of the study is that 
all member states are to gain and there will not be a 
signiﬁ cant shift of jobs across borders.
The following is a closer presentation of the study 
by Copenhagen Economics, which allows the reader 
a better understanding of how these ﬁ gures are ob-
tained. 
The Economic Impact of the Services Directive 
The study follows a new methodological approach, 
which captures many, albeit not all, of the nuances of 
the consequences of the directive. It traces the effect 
of the directive by following how the legal reforms 
directly affect the performance of actual ﬁ rms in the 
service sectors, and it calculates the direct and indi-
rect effects showing the full impact of the services di-
rective on sectoral and macroeconomic performance. 
The study proceeds in three steps. The ﬁ rst step 
measures the barriers to establishment and trade in 
the service sectors, for both domestic and foreign 
ﬁ rms, before and after the implementation of the di-
rective. The second step analyses how the barriers 
affect prices and productivity in the service sectors 
only based on a dataset containing more than 275 000 
ﬁ rms. The third and ﬁ nal step calculates the indirect 
economic consequences on the whole economy as 
other sectors take advantage of lower prices and 
higher productivity in the EU service sectors.
First Step: Measuring of Barriers
The ﬁ rst step translates qualitative legislation into 
quantitative measures that can be used in the quanti-
tative analysis. Barriers are measured and transformed 
into numbers by answering a large number of objec-
tive and detailed questions regarding restrictions on 
1 J. M. B a r ro s o : Creating a Europe of opportunities, The 2005 Rob-
ert Schuman Lecture for the Lisbon Council, 14.03.2005.
2 Copenhagen Economics: Economic Assessment of the Barriers to 
the Internal Market for Services, 1.1.2005. The full report is available at 
www.copenhageneconomics.com. 
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Figure 1
 An Illustration of the Domestic IMRIS and 
the Foreign IMRIS 
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Figure 2
 The Size of the IMRIS Indices in the Policy 
Scenarios
service provision in the Internal Market. Questions are 
asked for the four sectors: accountancy, retail, whole-
sale and IT-services in order to estimate the barriers 
before and after the implementation of the directive.  
All in all, 200 questions are asked about legal and 
non-legal barriers to service provision in each sector 
in each Member State. The questions are organised 
in different categories covering all steps from estab-
lishment and promotion to distribution, sale and after 
sales aspects. Also non-legal barriers such as legisla-
tion only in national language or opaque public proce-
dures are considered. 
The qualitative answers are transformed into 
quantitative measures called IMRIS (Internal Market 
Restrictiveness Index in Services) using a system of 
scores and weights according to their relative impor-
tance. Different indices are calculated for domestic 
and foreign companies, as they do not face the same 
barriers. 
Residence requirements, for example, affect only 
foreign ﬁ rms and restrictions on the use of temporary 
foreign workers may be stricter for foreign than do-
mestic ﬁ rms. Furthermore, even in the case when all 
discriminatory legal barriers have been eliminated, 
foreign ﬁ rms may still face barriers to establishment in 
another Member State. Not because of outright dis-
crimination, but simply because the rules and regula-
tions in the foreign Member State are different from the 
rules and regulations in the home country.
Figure 1 illustrates the result of the calculation of the 
IMRIS with different scores relating to domestic and 
foreign ﬁ rms. The foreign index is by deﬁ nition higher 
than the domestic. 
The IMRIS (for both domestic and foreign ﬁ rms) is 
then recalculated to reﬂ ect the situation after the im-
plementation of the services directive. The result is a 
whole different set of IMRIS showing the direct policy 
impact of the services directive. 
The study reveals the following general tendencies. 
First, barriers are largest in the accountancy sector, 
while barriers are lower in retail distribution, wholesale 
distribution, and IT-services. Second, barriers seem to 
be lower in new member states than in old member 
states. Third, barriers tend to be either high or low in all 
sectors within a member state.
Furthermore, the study estimates that the services 
directive, on average, reduces barriers to service pro-
vision by more than 50 per cent. The reductions are 
largest for regulated professions such as accountancy 
and smallest for other business services such as IT-
services. 
Figure 2 shows the impact of the services directive 
on barriers to trade and establishment in the regulated 
professions sector in Belgium.   
Second Step: Calculating the Impact of 
Barriers on Firm Performance 
The second step calculates how the price-cost 
margins are inﬂ uenced by the change in barriers as 
captured by the change in the IMRIS. This is done 
econometrically on the basis of a very comprehensive 
dataset containing more than 275 000 ﬁ rms from 19 
countries. The scope of this estimation vastly surpass-
es any previous study of this kind. The price and cost 
impacts are expressed in tariff equivalents, i.e. as per-
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centage impacts on prices. The tariff equivalents can 
be thought of as hypothetical taxes that are computed 
to create economic effects that are equivalent to the 
economic effects of the actual barriers as measured 
by the IMRIS indices. 
The study uses a speciﬁ cation of ﬁ rm proﬁ tability 
that takes into account barriers as well as ﬁ rm spe-
ciﬁ c differences. Each ﬁ rm’s proﬁ tability is affected by 
several factors speciﬁ c to that ﬁ rm. The econometric 
model needs to control for these factors, for example 
proﬁ ts earned on other activities, operational efﬁ cien-
cy, size of ﬁ rms, capital and labour intensity in pro-
duction, and solvency of the company. Finally, at the 
economy-wide level each country’s barriers as well as 
other aggregate economic variables are included to 
measure the direct impact on ﬁ rms’ performance.  
Barriers affect ﬁ rms in two ways: as rent-creating 
and cost-creating. Rent-creating barriers reduce com-
petition between service providers, for example re-
quirements that ﬁ rms must be owned or controlled by 
local professionals. This provides protection for incum-
bent providers. Rent-creating barriers reduce compe-
tition, inﬂ ate prices above costs and generate rents to 
the incumbent ﬁ rms. This type of barrier is represented 
through an exogenous mark-up over costs. The barrier 
can be thought of as creating a price-wedge between 
producer prices and producer costs. The more indirect 
and dynamic effects of rent-creating barriers, by limit-
ing competition and thereby reducing productivity, are 
not considered in the model.
Cost-creating barriers increase the use of real 
resources. For example, it may require extra use of 
labour to overcome a given barrier. This type of bar-
rier is represented through an exogenous productivity 
factor. That is, removal of this type of barrier improves 
productivity in the sense that more output can be 
produced with the same amount of input (or the same 
output can be produced with smaller amounts of in-
put).
The barrier reductions reduce prices and increase 
productivity. This is because lower rent-creating bar-
riers imply a smaller price wedge between producer 
prices and producer costs resulting in lower prices 
of services and creating an allocative efﬁ ciency gain. 
Lower cost-creating barriers imply productivity gains 
because the same output can be produced with 
fewer resources. In turn, productivity increases, lead-
ing to higher wages and return to capital. Output will 
therefore increase most in those sectors where barri-
ers are reduced the most. Similarly, welfare gains will 
be largest in those Member States where barriers are 
reduced the most.
As noted, reductions in cost-creating barriers in-
crease productivity. Productivity gains enable creation 
of higher value added and lower costs thus creating a 
surplus for the sectors involved. This surplus is distrib-
uted as lower prices to consumers, higher wages and 
increased return to capital. Because the surplus more 
than outweighs lower proﬁ ts for incumbents from rent-
creating barriers, the net effect is a rise in income. 
Lower prices and higher spending combine to stimu-
late demand in all sectors of the economy. Increased 
demand calls for higher output which compensates for 
jobs lost through improvements in labour productivity.
Third Step: Estimating the Economy-wide 
Consequences
In the ﬁ nal step, the economy-wide effects of reduc-
ing barriers to service provision are calculated. This is 
done in a sophisticated global computable general 
equilibrium model – the Copenhagen Economics Trade 
Model (CETM) – that captures all linkages between the 
different sectors of the economy and therefore allows 
for an economy-wide assessment of the economic 
impact of removing barriers to service provision. All in 
all, the study estimates that the implementation of the 
directive will increase total consumption in the EU by 
0.6% followed by the creation of up to 600 000 new 
jobs across Europe. 
Figure 3
Impact of the Services Directive in Individual 
Countries
N o t e : A darker shading reﬂ ects larger welfare gains. Welfare is meas-
ured as comprehensive consumption.
S o u rc e : CETM model – Copenhagen Economics
1.4
0.8
0.1
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The directive directly affects business services, 
services provided to both businesses and consumers, 
and consumer services. In addition, it also has impor-
tant knock-on effects on other sectors. The knock-on 
effects arise partly because the affected services are 
important inputs to the rest of the economy, and partly 
through the markets for labour and capital. Production 
and employment changes in industrial sectors also 
generate feedback effects on the services sectors. 
The Copenhagen Economics Trade Model captures 
both the direct effects on the service providers and the 
indirect effects on their suppliers and customers. The 
model, therefore, captures the important backward 
and forward linkages both among ﬁ rms and between 
ﬁ rms and ﬁ nal consumers, i.e. ordinary households 
and government.
The CETM model focuses particularly on the indi-
vidual countries in the EU and on the sectors where 
barriers have a signiﬁ cant economy-wide impact. The 
model also incorporates the rest of the world and a 
goods-producing sector, but does so in a more styl-
ised manner to ensure both transparency and tracta-
bility of the model.
The impact of the services directive in each country 
is illustrated in Figure 3. The two primary determinants 
for each country are the size of the service sectors and 
the size of the reduced barriers. For example, the bar-
riers in the regulated professions in the UK are below 
the EU average, but the consequences are more no-
ticeable than on average because of the large size of 
the sector.  
It should be noted that the results of this study are 
based on the implementation of the proposed services 
directive as drafted by Bolkestein. Currently, it seems 
doubtful that the proposal will be accepted in its origi-
nal form. If the services directive is revised it follows 
naturally that a more modest removal of barriers most 
likely will be followed by more modest welfare and job 
gains. 
Does This Really Matter in the Big Picture?
That removal of barriers has a direct effect on the 
overall economy is evident. The Internal Market pro-
gramme implemented through the last 10 years has in-
creased the overall EU GDP by 1.8 percentage points 
making it €164.5 billion higher. Analysis shows that 2.5 
million extra jobs have been created in the EU as a re-
sult of the opening of frontiers.3
The services directive will add to these gains of the 
Internal Market increasing consumption by 0.6% and 
jobs by 600 000. These gains seem to be signiﬁ cant, 
albeit not extraordinary, additional gains especially 
taking into consideration that they are the conse-
quences of a single directive – and not a whole pack-
age of legal reforms. 
Furthermore, the real impact is likely to be even 
higher as the above calculations are based on rather 
conservative assumptions. The study includes only 
three service sectors: regulated professions, distribu-
tive trade and business services. These three service 
sectors account for roughly two thirds of the scope 
of the services directive. The economic impact of the 
services directive may therefore be higher as sec-
tors excluded from this study such as construction 
services and leisure services are also affected by the 
services directive. On the other hand, due to the lack 
of sufﬁ ciently reliable data we cannot rule out the pos-
sibility that the impact of the services directive is less 
positive for the sectors excluded from the analysis. 
Who Will Win and Who Will Lose?
The member states mostly affected by the direc-
tive are those with relatively high barriers and large 
service sectors. The most regulated sectors are ac-
counting and auditing and the least are IT-services 
and operational services. This means that even though 
regulated professions, lawyers and auditors, represent 
a relatively small sector, the contribution is substantial 
because of the large barriers. In contrast, distributive 
trade, retail and wholesale have below average regu-
lation but due to the large size of the sectors even a 
modest reduction of barriers has signiﬁ cant effects. 
It is argued that the services directive will espe-
cially beneﬁ t SMEs as barriers today make it costly 
to engage in cross-border activities with qualiﬁ cation 
requirements that are mostly independent of ﬁ rm 
size, i.e. larger companies can more easily pay entry 
costs or are able to establish subsidiary ﬁ rms. This 
study does not give any ﬁ rm indications whether this 
is valid or not but in contrast to most other studies, the 
results, which show a positive effect, are based on the 
direct performance of enterprises of all sizes – includ-
ing small and medium sized. 
If there are winners, there may also be losers. Total 
employment will rise, but reallocation of labour may 
lead to isolated declines in employment in some sec-
tors. However, according to the study the overall in-
crease in demand in the EU will be signiﬁ cantly larger 
than before such that the net result in all member 
3 European Commission: The Internal Market – ten years without fron-
tiers, SEC(2002) 1417 of 7.1.2003.
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The German law on the posting of workers abroad – the “Entsendegesetz” of 1996 – primarily ap-
plies to the construction industry.1 It makes obligatory 
minimum wages in this industry possible. Observation 
of low-wage competitors from the countries that ac-
ceded to the EU in 2004, and from Poland in particular, 
has prompted plans on the part of the German gov-
ernment to extend the application of the law to all sec-
tors of the economy. According to trade union ﬁ gures, 
26 000 butchers alone have been displaced from the 
German labour market by cheaper workers from the 
new EU member states.
This contribution begins by clarifying the legal 
situation, which is complex and confusing.2 It then 
goes on to discuss whether such legal amendment 
is supportable within the context of economic policy. 
The result will be that it makes sense for government 
policy to stand by workers who are particularly badly 
Wernhard Möschel*
Wage Dumping and Germany’s “Entsendegesetz”
affected by structural change. However, the proposed 
approach is counter-productive. Rather than putting 
an end to Germany’s labour market plight, it actually 
makes it worse.
Free Movement of Labour
The employment of EC-foreigners touches on Com-
munity law and national norms. One speaks of the 
free movement of labour when, for example, a Polish 
worker takes up dependent employment in Germany. 
This was not possible prior to Poland’s accession to 
the EU. Nor will it be possible in future – at least within 
a transition period which can be extended up to 2011. 
* Professor of Law, University of Tuebingen, former Chairman of the 
German Monopolies Commission and of the Scientiﬁ c Advisory Board 
to the Ministry of Economics and Labour, Berlin, Germany.
1 Primary construction industry and secondary construction work. The 
latter includes demolition and wrecking, painting and lacquering, and 
the rooﬁ ng trade. On the initiative of the city-state of Hamburg, the law 
was extended at the last minute to encompass the maritime shipping 
assistance services (harbour tugs). The aim of this initiative was to 
protect around 100 jobs in Hamburg from competition from unem-
ployed harbour tug crews in the new Länder of eastern Germany. 
2 There is a good overview in Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Ar-
beit: Informationen über die Anwendung des EU-Beitrittsvertrages bei 
der Beschäftigung von Staatsangehörigen der Beitrittsstaaten of 28th 
January 2004: http://www.bmwa.bund.de/Redaktion/Inhalte/Pdf/eu-
beitrittsvertrag-beschaeftigung-frage-antwort,property=pdf.pdf
states and all aggregate sectors seems to be a gain in 
jobs. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that 
there may be a net loss in some very speciﬁ c sectors.
The main fear is that local or national producers of 
services will be overrun by foreign companies offering 
cheap alternatives based on more lenient legislation 
and lower wages, and that the directive thereby would 
initiate a race to the bottom as companies might re-
establish themselves in the countries with the lowest 
legal standards. 
This may be a real risk, but EU-wide rules already 
support minimum levels of consumer protection and 
a large part of the regulation with regard to any EU 
worker is still based not on the country of origin but on 
place of work. This includes health, safety, maximum 
work periods and minimum rest periods and many 
more. Finally, a race to the bottom in quality would 
only occur if no one wanted to pay more for better 
services. 
In the long run it is likely that high-regulation coun-
tries would remove some of their excessive formal-
ity, making national governments’ regulations more 
streamlined or replacing them by EU standards.
Summing Up on the Mechanisms of the Directive
To sum up, the key mechanisms of the directive are 
as follows. The directive makes it easier and less cost-
ly to start new enterprises – entry costs are brought 
down. More enterprises stimulate competition, in par-
ticular on markets with few, large ﬁ rms. Competition 
brings down prices. 
The directive also makes it easier, less costly, to 
run enterprises – operating costs are brought down. 
Lower costs increase productivity. Higher productivity 
leads to lower prices and higher wages. 
Lower service prices and higher wages stimulate 
demand – giving rise to a net gain of new jobs, value 
added and consumption.
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In this respect, the applicability of Art. 39 ff. of the EC 
Treaty has been foreclosed. Exceptions exist on the 
basis of bilateral agreements. This is the case with 
regard to seasonal workers placed in temporary jobs, 
notably in the agricultural sector and in the hotel and 
catering industry. These are joined by guest workers 
who wish to spend a year in Germany – with a possible 
six-month extension – as part of their vocational train-
ing and in order to improve their language skills. Both 
of these groups require an individual work permit, 
which can also be obtained through their future em-
ployer. A work permit can only be issued “if the worker 
is not employed at less favourable working conditions 
than comparable German workers” (Art. 285 (1)3 of 
the Social Security Code III). This legal discrimination 
ban already ensures wage equality at this point. In 
certain peripheral cases it is also possible to take up 
dependent employment without prior permission, e.g. 
if a Polish citizen studying in Germany carries out a 
holiday job for a period of up to three months.
The real problem in relation to the free movement of 
labour is that of clandestine employment. Such em-
ployment remains illegal.
Free Movement of the Self-employed
Free movement of the self-employed, otherwise 
known as freedom of establishment, encompasses 
the right to take up and pursue activities as self-em-
ployed persons and to set up and manage companies, 
branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member 
State established in the territory of any Member State 
(Art. 43 ff. EC Treaty). Here, in contrast to the free 
movement of dependent employees, there are no tran-
sitional regulations. Admittedly, anyone making use of 
the freedom of establishment must comply with voca-
tional and trade law regulations in the same way as 
any national citizen. This means, for example, that it is 
not admissible for a Polish subsidiary company in Ger-
many to employ cheaper Polish workers. This would 
require their freedom of movement, which is ruled out 
as a matter of basic principle until the year 2011.
In practice, the problem in this context is that of de-
pendent workers acting as supposedly self-employed 
persons (“Scheinselbständige”). Their activities remain 
illegal.
Freedom of Services
The legal focus is on the freedom to provide serv-
ices (Art. 49 ff. EC Treaty). This covers cross-border 
activities of an industrial or commercial character, as 
well as those of craftsmen and professionals. In con-
trast to the freedom of establishment, these services 
are always selective, temporary activities. Admittedly, 
the freedom to provide services also covers cases in 
which a subcontractor takes up a temporary activity 
for a particular construction project. Here it is impor-
tant to distinguish between two groups of regulations. 
The ﬁ rst group concerns transitional regulations that 
are only valid up to the year 2011. The second group 
consists of permanent regulations. These include the 
EC’s “Posting Directive”3 as well as the German law on 
the posting of employees abroad (“Entsendegesetz”), 
which is based on the EC directive and is now to be 
comprehensively extended. The two groups of regula-
tions overlap in places.
In accordance with the transitional rules for EU 
accession states, certain bilateral agreements and 
individual national provisions remain in force for the 
time being. These include above all the agreement 
governing the posting of workers on the basis of a 
“Werkvertrag” – a contract for particular services, as 
3 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the frame-
work of the provision of services, OJ L 018, 21 January 1997, pp. 16.
Table 1
Negotiated Wages Declared by the Federal 
Minister of Economics and Labour to be Generally 
Binding on the Basis of the Law on the Posting of 
Employees Abroad 
(“Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz”)
N o t e s : Rooﬁ ng trade: single wage group; Monthly wages: based on 
regular weekly working hours. Original data: Federal Ministry of Eco-
nomics and Labour, Federal Statistics Ofﬁ ce.
S o u rc e : iwd, No. 15 of 14 April 2005, p. 8.
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skilled 
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Semi-
skilled 
workers
Skilled 
work-
ers
Semi-
skilled 
workers
Skilled 
work-
ers
Primary 
construc-
tion industry
Western 
Germany
10.36 12.47 1,758 2,116 60.5 72.8
Eastern 
Germany
8.95 10.01 1,518 1,690 52.2 58.1
Demolition 
and wreck-
ing industry
Western 
Germany
9.49 11.60 1,527 1,867 52.2 64.2
Eastern 
Germany
8.95 9.65 1,557 1,679 53.5 57.7
Paint-
ing and 
lacquering 
trade
Western 
Germany
7.69 10.53 1,338 1,832 46.0 63.0
Eastern 
Germany
7.00 9.20 1,218 1,601 41.9 55.1
Rooﬁ ng 
trade
Western 
Germany
9.30 9.30 1,578 1,578 54.3 54.3
Eastern 
Germany
9.30 9.30 1,578 1,578 54.3 54.3
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opposed to a contract of employment – which affects 
the following sectors: the construction industry and 
related branches, the cleaning of buildings, ﬁ xtures 
and means of transport, and the activities of interior 
decorators. This is where German work permit law 
steps in. It leads to the proscription of discrimination 
mentioned earlier as set out in Art. 285 (1)3 of the 
Social Security Code III. Moreover, a double quota 
mechanism is in place. Ceilings exist for each acces-
sion country with regard to the number of workers to 
be posted. For Poland, this ceiling is currently set at 
13 185. In the second half of last year, 79% of this 
quota was used up. In addition, there is a quota with 
regard to the company in Germany that takes on these 
contract workers (“Werkvertrags arbeitnehmer”). In the 
construction industry, for example, no more than 15 
contract workers are permissible in cooperation with 
a contractor with up to 50 employees. In the case of a 
general contractor with more than 50 employees, the 
number of contract workers can increase to 30% of 
regular staff. The absolute limit is 300 contract work-
ers per general contractor.
In all other sectors, such as the cross-border and 
temporary rendering of consulting and IT services, 
transitional regulations are already a thing of the past. 
In practice, regulations are abused in that workers 
are only ostensibly posted from abroad. The employer 
e.g. in Poland, with whom an employment contract 
must exist, is no more than a letter-box company.
Germany’s “Entsendegesetz”
In Germany, the most important restrictions stem 
from the law on the posting of employees abroad, the 
“Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz”. When it was passed 
in 1996, it had nothing to do with the accession of new 
member states to the EU. It served at the time as a 
defence against construction workers from Portugal, 
England and Ireland. It is valid for an indeﬁ nite period. 
Even today, some regulations already apply across the 
board, irrespective of the particular industry; these in-
clude rules on maximum working hours and minimum 
rest periods, the minimum length of paid holiday, as 
well as safety, health protection, and hygiene at work. 
Beyond this, according to the stipulations of Article 1 
of the “Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz”, minimum 
wages are to be paid to all workers in the construc-
tion industry and some related ﬁ elds4 including foreign 
contract workers. This is subject to the condition that 
the application of the relevant collective labour agree-
ment has been declared to be generally binding.5 Here, 
in deviation from the general rule of Article 5 of the Law 
on Collective Labour Agreements (“Tarifver tragsge-
setz”), no agreement between the parties is required. 
At the request of a trade union, the Federal Minister of 
Economics and Labour may alone declare a collective 
labour agreement to be generally binding on an entire 
industry. He does this by means of an executive order 
(“Rechtsver ordnung”). Table 1 provides an overview at 
the end of 2004.
The planned extension of the “Arbeitnehmer-
Entsendegesetz” now intends to extend such 
minimum wages, which dock on to collective wage 
agreements and are not legally deﬁ ned,6 to all branch-
es of the economy. Such extension is not in breach of 
the EC “Posting of Workers” directive.7
Economic Objections
First of all we may note that the terms “wage dump-
ing” or “social dumping” as used in the political debate 
could be misleading. In foreign trade theory we speak 
of “dumping” when a foreign worker offers his labour 
for a wage that is lower than in his home country.8 This 
is not the case at present, for the differences in wage 
costs between the eastern European EU states and 
Germany are still immense. On average, labour costs 
in eastern Europe are roughly one seventh of German 
levels.9 However, politicians are not obliged to use a 
term in the speciﬁ c meaning which experts associ-
ate with it. Moreover, it is probably fair to say that the 
public is not being misled simply because they are not 
familiar with economic terminology.
From the perspective of liberal economists, mini-
mum wages are in the neighbourhood of a thing of 
the devil, striking the concept of the Single Market 
with its free ﬂ ow of products and production factors 
at the very core. The promise of increasing wealth for 
all, born of a division of labour that even transcends 
4 Cf. footnote 1.
5 Besides minimum tariffs, the length of holiday time, holiday pay or 
additional holiday money are also covered.
6 In theory, statutory minimum wages can also be introduced in Ger-
many by means of executive order in accordance with the Minimum 
Employment Conditions Act of 11 January 1952. 
7 Cf. recital (12) of the directive: “.. the Community law does not 
preclude Member States from applying their legislation, or collec-
tive agreements entered into by employers and labour, to any person 
who is employed, even temporarily, within their territory, although his 
employer is established in another Member State; ... Community law 
does not forbid Member States to guarantee the observance of those 
rules by the appropriate means.”
8 Cf. Kronberger Kreis: Entsendegesetz – ein Irrweg, Financial Times 
Deutschland, 22 April 2005, p. 34.
9 Details in H.-W. S i n n : Basar-Ökonomie Deutschland. Exportwelt-
meister oder Schlusslicht?, in: ifo Schnelldienst, No. 6, 2005, pp. 1, 
20.
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national borders and of the comparative advantages 
of specialisation, is retracted. The steering function of 
prices is revoked. It is as if the hand of a thermometer 
were bound in place. Losers are found everywhere:
• the foreign workers, who are hampered in their ef-
forts to take up employment in this country;
• the consumers in this country, who have to pay 
higher prices than would be necessary under com-
petitive conditions;
• the workers in this country, who cannot ﬁ nd any 
work for the factual minimum wage – in Germany 
this is true of construction workers in the eastern 
Länder for example – and for whom no jobs are cre-
ated that would otherwise result from the alternative 
use of the money saved by the consumer;
• companies in this country, so far as they are depend-
ent on low-cost labour for maintaining or developing 
their competitiveness.
Since David Ricardo there has been widespread 
consensus on this liberal credo among economists. 
Let there be a warning, however: this view requires 
functioning, i.e. sufﬁ ciently ﬂ exible, labour markets. 
This is the only way to absorb the burdens of adjust-
ment inherent in massive structural change with a 
minimum of friction. This ﬂ exibility could be missing.10
There is great doubt as to whether the minimum 
wage is really a suitable instrument to protect domes-
tic workers and industries from foreign competition in 
the long term. 
The minimum wage requirement can be side-
stepped relatively easily. One example found in the 
construction industry is the practice of charging for 
fewer hours than actually worked. Preventing such 
practices requires an extensive monitoring bureauc-
racy. While there is no doubt that this generates costs, 
it is questionable whether it can really achieve its goal, 
for the creativity of those involved in ﬁ nding methods 
of evasion to serve their mutual interests can be as-
sumed to be practically unlimited. 
This is augmented by the substitution of excluded or 
hindered factor mobility by trade in goods. The foreign 
worker is employed abroad; his cheap labour enters 
the country in the form of correspondingly low-priced 
products. Alternatively, domestic demand is met by 
having services rendered abroad. Thus, for example, 
the hotel industry in Berlin has its daily washing done 
in neighbouring Poland. From there it is sent back 
to Berlin. These phenomena are part of the process 
of factor price equalisation, which is imposed by the 
forces of cross-border competition: wages in the old 
industrialised countries, including Germany, are sub-
jected to a process of convergence in which, on the 
other side, the wages inter alia in the new EU Member 
States of eastern Europe participate. The process 
of factor price equalisation “has an inherent power 
and doggedness that is impossible to hold back in-
deﬁ nitely.”11 Qualifying this view, however, it must be 
recognised that such adjustments can take a very long 
time. It is estimated that wage costs in eastern Europe 
will not reach 50% of those in western Germany until 
the year 2030.12 In many cases, moreover, it is not 
easy to implement the substitution of factor mobil-
ity mentioned above. A Polish construction labourer 
who is not permitted to work in Germany could help 
build pre-fabricated houses for export from Poland to 
Germany. However, such exports are not realistic for a 
number of reasons.
Finally, to the list of economic reasons for objec-
tion to the planned extension of the “Entsendegesetz” 
should be added that clinging to outdated structures 
could weaken the incentive to initiate far-reaching 
reforms. In many cases, problems resurface at a later 
date with increased urgency and under more difﬁ cult 
conditions. The reform of Germany’s statutory pen-
sion insurance scheme, which has been put off for 25 
years, may serve to corroborate this view.
Mistaken Arguments
The counter-argument that many other countries 
have established a statutory minimum wage bears 
little weight, since they have not proven effective.13 In 
many cases they are substitutes for ensuring a mini-
mum income, which in Germany is guaranteed by the 
“Arbeitslosengeld II” unemployment beneﬁ t, or else 
their binding effect is minor. One reason for this is that 
they often affect only a small number of companies. Or 
a minimum wage set in nominal terms loses real value 
through inﬂ ation. In cases where a minimum wage has 
a genuine impact, the disadvantageous effects on em-
ployment are well documented. One example of this 
is the relatively high level of youth unemployment in 
France.
11 According to H.-W. S i n n , op. cit., p. 40.
12 Ibid., p. 20 with evidence.
13 Cf. W. F r a n z : Protektionismus, in: ZEWnews, April 2005, p. 8; Kro-
nberger Kreis, op. cit.
10  Cf. sections below on competition of regulatory systems and sof-
tening the impact of structural change.
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In Germany, the Minimum Employment Conditions 
Act of 1952 allows for a statutory minimum wage. It 
requires a corresponding executive order from the 
Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour, which in 
turn is preceded by a resolution on the part of a main 
committee and an expert committee. Regulations 
established by collective bargaining override such 
minimum employment conditions. The law has never 
been applied. Its existence has been virtually forgotten 
– from an economic point of view justiﬁ ably so.
Two arguments frequently brought forward by op-
ponents of an extension of the “Arbeit nehmer-Entsen-
degesetz” are also mistaken, however. One is the fear 
of protectionist counter-measures affecting trade in 
goods on the part of the foreign countries affected. 
Just as people in Germany speak of wage dumping, 
so could people in other countries look on German 
goods as a form of “capital dumping” or “education 
dumping”.14 Such an approach is possible. Yet it is 
important to realise that there is an asymmetry in 
European Community law between the freedom of 
movement of goods, which is strictly protected, on the 
one hand, and the freedom to provide services, which 
enjoys only limited protection, on the other. The “Post-
ing of Workers” directive, which constitutes binding, 
if only secondary, European law, explicitly does not 
prevent the Member States from applying their laws 
or collective wage agreements to all those employed 
within their sovereign territory, even if the employer is 
established in another Member State.15 The European 
Court has given its blessing to this regulation.16
Finally, the theory that foreign employers could only 
be forced to abide by the minimum wages laid down 
in German collective bargaining agreements if they 
are universally applicable is inaccurate. It is argued 
that this would pave the way for a situation – which 
must be regarded with a critical eye – in which col-
lective agreements on pay and conditions would have 
a single national structure.17 What is correct is that a 
national ruling may not include any discrimination to 
the disadvantage of employers established abroad 
(Art. 49/50 EC Treaty). Such discrimination can also 
be avoided within the framework of regional collective 
agreements.18
Competition of Regulatory Systems 
The catalogue of traditional objections to any form 
of protectionism is incomplete even from a strictly 
economical point of view. Moreover, the catalogue is 
limited in as far as it fails to take non-economic con-
siderations into account. This is particularly true of so-
cial policy considerations such as the provision of help 
for workers who are suddenly or severely affected by 
structural change. If one is open to such ideas, it is not 
so much a question of “whether” regulatory interven-
tion is necessary, but of “how”. In this case, however, 
the catalogue of economic objections becomes part 
of a weighing-up process and is no longer able to gen-
erate a deﬁ nitive answer on its own.
This catalogue of objections does not address the 
dimension of competition between regulatory sys-
tems that inevitably occurs in the case of a classic 
liberal approach. Such competition is not necessarily 
efﬁ cient.19 The question remains justiﬁ ed: what sense 
does it make for a legal order to remove certain ob-
jects from the market and thus from competition, only 
to then re-introduce competition through the back 
door in the form of competition between the systems? 
The answer can lie in the innovative and at the same 
time power-limiting effects of such competition. In 
this case, however, economic analysis is already open 
to the necessity of weighing up the alternatives. It 
was along these lines and with regard to the conﬂ ict 
between a “place of establishment principle” and a 
“place of production principle” for labour and social 
regulations that in its annual report of 1989/90 – i.e. 
years before the introduction of the “Arbeitnehmer-
Entsendegesetz” – the German Council of Economic 
Advisors for example spoke out in favour of applying 
the latter approach.20 Its intention was to avoid the 
emergence of “split labour markets”. These would 
trigger off negative external effects. Social tension 
would ensue. The scope of the legislator to shape 
and organise would ultimately be undermined in an 
uncontrolled manner. These effects would lead to 
conﬂ icts between the countries in question and this 
might then possibly result in unwelcome standardised 
19 Cf. for example H.-W. S i n n : The New Systems Competition, Ox-
ford 2003.
20 Annual Report 1989/90, Stuttgart 1989, subindex 465; very critical, 
however, with regard especially to the German “Entsendegesetz” An-
nual Report 1995/96, Stuutgart 1995, subindex 390 et seq. and An-
nual Report 1996/97, Stuttgart 1996, subindex 320 et seq.
14 Cf. J. E e k h o f f : Entsendegesetz – eine Aushöhlung der Wirtschaft-
sordnung, in: Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol. 45, 1996, pp. 17, 
24.
15 Cf. quotation in footnote 7.
16 Judgment of the Court of 23 November 1999 in the joined cases 
C-369/96 and C-376/96 (Arblade and Leloup), European Court reports 
1999, pp. I-08498, I-08526.
17 According to the Kronberger Kreis, op. cit.
18 For details cf. W. K o b e r s k i , G. A s s h o f f , D. H o l d : Arbeitneh-
mer-Entsendegesetz, 2nd edition Munich 2002, Article 1, No. 167 et 
seq.
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European regulations. “Weighing up these disadvan-
tages of the place of establishment principle against 
the advantages ultimately gives preference to the 
place of production principle: that those labour and 
social regulations are to be applied that are valid at the 
place of production.”21 These considerations cannot 
be limited to labour and social regulations in a narrow 
sense, for wage levels and labour and social regula-
tions have a reciprocal inﬂ uence on one another – they 
are connected like two communicating tubes. One 
could argue that functioning competition necessarily 
leads to an alignment of wages for identical tasks at 
one and the same location. What is important is that 
the uniform result is exacted by competition and not 
by means of cartel-like measures (collective bargain-
ing) or government regulations. “It (i.e. competition) 
reduces wage differentials for similar tasks at a par-
ticular location to productivity or cost differences, i.e. 
Portuguese construction workers will receive lower 
wages to the extent that they are less productive and 
the enterprise is faced with higher costs. Only when 
German wage levels (the result of collective bargain-
ing) exceed market wages can the wage differential 
go beyond these differences.”22 This ultimately refers 
us to fully functioning labour markets as the better 
regulatory option. This aspect will be revisited at a 
later juncture.23
Softening the Impact of Structural Change
Economic criteria are abandoned when socio-po-
litical considerations come into play. Whether or not 
a social order comes to the aid of workers suffering 
hardship as a result of structural change is a normative 
question, the answer to which is often positive. This 
is demonstrated for example by the numerous transi-
tional regulations related to developments that bring 
about severe structural fractures. The same is true 
of the question of whether a legal order should take 
deep-rooted notions of social fairness into account in 
its regulations. Thus large sectors of the population 
associate wage dumping with circumstances in which, 
for example, a posted construction worker dwells in 
a cheap building-site accommodation unit provided 
by his employer and lives on bread and milk and an 
occasional hard-cured sausage brought from home. 
With the low wage earned in Germany he provides for 
his family who stayed behind in his home country. In 
contrast, a German worker competing with the posted 
employee has no means of escaping the far higher 
costs of living in Germany. Differences in living circum-
stances of this nature, which have nothing to do with 
job performance, are often considered to be a distor-
tion of competition. 
While Germany’s legislators have not closed their 
eyes to such considerations, they have adopted a rel-
atively cautious approach. The “Arbeitnehmer-Entsen-
degesetz” allows for minimum wages in just a few 
branches of industry. They tend to amount to between 
50 and 60% of the average wage in the industries con-
cerned.24 If this were to remain the case following a 
general extension of the “Entsende gesetz” to the rest 
of the economy then the protectionist effect of this 
change in legislation would be relatively modest.
From this point of departure, the decisive ques-
tion for legislative considerations is which options are 
available to solve socio-political problems. Essentially, 
this is a question of whether the side-condition of 
the strictly liberal model can be realised, i.e. whether 
functioning competition in the labour markets can be 
created. There is no lack of proposals.25 Examples 
include:
• efforts to introduce more ﬂ exibility to the labour 
markets, in particular by disposing of anything that 
hampers the creation of simple jobs;
• a continuation of the Hartz IV reform in the direction 
of an activating social beneﬁ t, moving away from 
wage substitution and towards wage supplementa-
tion;
• investive wage concepts within the framework of 
collective bargaining in which cash wages are partly 
replaced by a savings element;
• promoting innovations, which is most readily 
achieved through an efﬁ cient school and university 
system;
• promoting employee qualiﬁ cation; 
• providing mobility grants for those affected by struc-
tural change.
In this context too, however, sobriety of judgement 
remains the order of the day. It is not a question of 
solving problems within a ﬁ ctitious world, a model 
world, but in a real world that is just as it so happens 
to be. It is therefore necessary to bear the following in 
mind:
21 Ibid.
22 Cf. J. E e k h o f f , op. cit., p. 21.
23 Cf. footnote 25.
24 Cf. Table 1.
25 A typical example is H.-W. S i n n : Ist Deutschland noch zu retten?, 
Munich 2003, pp. 451 et seq.
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The EC was among the main proponents, towards the mid-1980s, calling for the creation of a serv-
ices agreement within the multilateral system. The 
Communities’ (and Commission’s) proactive approach 
may be attributed to a variety of factors, including: (i) 
commercial interests in improving trading opportuni-
ties in rapidly growing sectors such as telecommuni-
cations, ﬁ nancial and a variety of business services; 
(ii) the need to counterbalance the retarding inﬂ uence 
of agriculture in trade negotiations with a positive 
perspective in more dynamic sectors; (iii) the political 
advantage of using external commitments to protect 
progress in EC-internal deregulation and liberalisation 
of services from backsliding; and (iv) the possibility to 
strengthen the Community/Commission position vis-à-
vis the Member States in areas of shared competence 
(investment, movement of persons, etc.).1 Given the 
ﬁ erce resistance of a number of developing countries, 
in particular India and Brazil, however, the services 
negotiations of the Uruguay Round (1986-93/94) were 
all but plain sailing.2 Somewhat surprisingly, neverthe-
less, the Agreement that ultimately emerged from the 
negotiations has functioned very smoothly since its 
entry into force in 1995. In the same vein, the current 
round of services negotiations, launched in January 
2000, has taken on a similarly low proﬁ le, drawing only 
little (too little?) attention from Member governments 
and is certainly not to blame for the failed Ministerial 
Meeting in Cancun.
The apparent “success” of the GATS or, at least, the 
absence of major problems to date may be due in part 
to the shallow levels of commitments bound at the end 
of the Uruguay Round. An element of liberalisation was 
achieved in possibly only two areas, telecommunica-
tions and ﬁ nancial services, where negotiations were 
extended until 1997. The EC was able, given the state 
of internal market integration in these sectors, both to 
contribute to and to capitalise on these negotiations. 
In virtually all other areas, however, the commitments 
bound by WTO Members under the GATS remained 
conﬁ ned to locking in status quo conditions in a rather 
limited number of services. The ﬂ exibility provisions 
of the Agreement had made it particularly easy for 
individual countries to adjust their trade obligations 
to prevailing conditions and constraints in individual 
sectors.
Breadth of Coverage vs. Depth of Obligations
Given the diversity of political and economic 
conditions among WTO Members, ﬂ exibility is an 
1 R. A d l u n g : Liberalisierung und (De-)Regulierung von Dienstleis-
tungen in der Welthandelsorganisation: Versuch einer Zwischenbilanz 
aus Sicht der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, in: P.-C. M ü l l e r- G r a f f  
(ed.): Die Europäische Gemeinschaft in der Welthandelsorganisation, 
Baden-Baden 1999/2000, Nomos, pp. 131-156.
2 J. C ro o m e : Reshaping the World Trading System – A History of 
the Uruguay Round, The Hague, London, Boston 1999, Kluwer Law 
International. 
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• the concrete effectiveness of individual proposals is 
uncertain (e.g. promoting innovations);
• in part their effects will be felt in the long term at best 
(expansion of the education system);
• the idiosyncrasies of the political system hamper 
far-reaching reforms. In politics, to be right, but not 
to be seen by voters to be right, is not usually an op-
tion. Conversely, the temptation to avoid painful re-
forms is immense if the related costs are not booked 
until some future date.
In summary it may be concluded that, from an eco-
nomic point of view, an extension of the “Arbeitneh-
mer-Entsendegesetz” will do more harm than good. 
From a socio-political and politico-economic perspec-
tive it is a measure that is at best acceptable under 
conditions created by otherwise mistaken policies.
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indispensable element in an agreement that reaches 
far beyond traditional concepts of cross-border trans-
actions (“mode 1”) to cover as well the conditions 
governing outbound movements of service consum-
ers (“mode 2”), domestic commercial establishment 
(“mode 3”) and the presence of foreign nationals sup-
plying services (“mode 4”).3 The broad modal scope 
of the GATS is counterbalanced by much leeway in 
individual countries’ assumption of trade obligations. 
In particular, the GATS offers not only more room than 
the GATT for departures from most-favoured-nation 
(MFN) treatment – one of the few horizontal obliga-
tions that apply across virtually all services – but also 
allows for the continued operation of market access 
restrictions, including quotas, and denials of national 
treatment. Even in sectors in which access obligations 
(“speciﬁ c commitments”) have been assumed by a 
Member, market access and national treatment may 
be subjected to scheduled limitations. Virtually any 
policy concerns can thus be accommodated within 
the structure of the Agreement. The GATS does not 
even establish a hierarchy of more or less preferable 
forms of intervention, let alone priorities among modes 
of supply. There are no built-in incentives that would 
encourage, for example, a shift from numerical access 
barriers to price-based interventions, nor are there 
disciplines on governments’ strategic use of restric-
tions under one mode, e.g. cross-border trade, to 
promote trade under other modes, e.g., inward invest-
ment under mode 3.
Even within otherwise integrated markets, indi-
vidual regional units may continue to operate their 
own restrictions under one or more modes of supply. 
Relevant cases can be found in the schedules of many 
federal states, including the USA, Canada and, to a 
lesser degree, Switzerland.4 Not surprisingly, there are 
many similar entries in the Communities’ schedule. 
These include a sweeping cross-cutting limitation that 
provides cover for any public or private monopolies in 
individual member States (MS) which are tasked to 
supply “services considered as public utilities”.5 The 
legal status of such monopolies would be protected 
as well if the EC was not treated as a single unit, but 
as an economic integration area pursuant to Article V, 
the equivalent to Article XXIV of the GATT. The relevant 
provisions require participants to eliminate in their in-
ternal relations “substantially all discrimination” within 
the meaning of Article XVII (national treatment), but 
there is no obligation, whatsoever, to abolish non-
discriminatory access barriers, whether in the form of 
monopoly rights or quota restrictions. Thus, regard-
less of the Communities’ status, the GATS provides 
wide scope for the perpetuation of divergent internal 
trade regimes.6
These ﬂ exibility provisions, though indispensable, 
may come at a cost in particular to the EC. Given the 
absence of binding (and biting) framework obligations, 
the GATS may prove less effective than the GATT in 
helping “Brussels” to establish, and promote compli-
ance with, a common trade regime among the MS. 
Of course, the Agreement is perfectly suitable to bind 
services reforms and, thus, enhance their internal and 
external credibility, but it is difﬁ cult to see how it could 
help to launch projects that are resisted by incumbent 
service suppliers and their political proponents.7 The 
ministries responsible for, e.g., banking, insurance, 
health, education or immigration will certainly resent 
sacriﬁ cing national competencies on the altar of inter-
national trade negotiations.
Nevertheless, whenever the Communities manage 
to push through internal reforms, these may have 
positive external effects even within existing patterns 
of GATS obligations. Full commitments on national 
treatment, where they exist, create a situation compa-
rable to trade in goods under the GATT, where Article 
III provides for the automatic extension of any new in-
ternal laws and regulations etc. to imports. Within the 
broader modal framework of GATS, however, the no-
tion of “imports” – and, as a result, the potential reach 
of the national treatment concept – has been extended 
to three more types of transaction.8
The following sections seek to trace the status of 
core GATS provisions and their application within the 
Communities’ trade regime.
6 The individual EC MS are WTO Members as well. While the Uruguay 
Round commitments scheduled by the Communities apply only to the 
then 12 MS and the results of the extended negotiations on telecom 
and ﬁ nancial services to 15 MS, the schedule envisaged to result from 
the ongoing round is set to cover all 25 current MS. 
7 R. A d l u n g : GATS and Democratic Legitimacy, in: Aussenwirtschaft, 
Vol. 59, No. II.
3 For a more detailed discussion of the modal scope of the Agree-
ment and its application to individual sectors see, for example, WTO: 
Guide to the GATS: An Overview of Issues for Further Liberalization 
of Trade in Services, The Hague, London, Boston, 2001, Kluwer Law 
International.
4 For example, the schedule of Switzerland provides for the continued 
operation of public monopolies on ﬁ re and national damage insur-
ance in 19 cantons;  access to other parts of the country is largely 
unrestricted. 
5 If such services are provided in “the exercise of governmental au-
thority”, i.e. neither on a commercial basis nor in competition, they are 
completely exempt from the GATS in any event. 
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MFN Treatment: Cornerstone with Fuzzy Edges
The MFN requirement is the only core obligation 
that has a similar status in both GATT and GATS. 
However, apart from “traditional” departures covering, 
for instance economic integration projects (Article V), 
the GATS contains a sweeping exemption for all MFN-
inconsistent measures that Members listed at the end 
of the Uruguay Round or, if later, the date of acces-
sion. Pursuant to Article II:2 and a related Annex, WTO 
Members are entitled to maintain the measures in-
scribed in their exemption lists for periods not exceed-
ing ten years “in principle”, and subject to negotiations 
in any subsequent trade rounds. Moreover, given the 
Agreement’s broad modal coverage and the dearth 
of international standards in services, the drafters of 
GATS provided more scope for (discretionary) recog-
nition of foreign standards, licences and certiﬁ cates 
than exists under the GATT.
An overview of existing MFN exemptions, produced 
in 2000, lists over 420 measures, involving more than 
two-thirds of WTO Members.9 The sector focus is on 
various transport services (35 per cent) as well as au-
diovisual services (20 per cent), a particularly sensitive 
sector for the EC. The vast majority of the exemptions, 
including those inscribed by the EC, are intended to 
apply for an open-ended (“indeﬁ nite”, “unspeciﬁ ed” 
etc.) period, which needs to be set, of course, against 
the ten-year timeframe provided for in the Agreement. 
The current exemption list of the EC contains some 40 
measures, concerning mostly audiovisual and trans-
port services, about one-half of which are maintained 
at the level of individual MS.10 Very few have been 
earmarked for termination in the Communities’ initial 
offer.
The need to provide scope for recognition meas-
ures appears particularly pressing in the context of 
a services agreement that covers not only product 
ﬂ ows, but extends to factor movements. Conformity 
with prevailing standards and other regulatory require-
ments is a core determinant of foreign products or 
producers being permitted to compete. Article VII of 
the GATS is thus intended to provide legal cover for 
the autonomous or mutually agreed recognition of 
qualiﬁ cations, licences, certiﬁ cates etc. obtained in 
another country. The relevant provisions are combined 
with procedural disciplines designed to prevent recog-
nition measures from being used “to dilute entirely the 
MFN obligation”.11 In particular, interested Members 
must be afforded “adequate opportunity” to negotiate 
their accession to such agreements or, in the event 
of autonomous recognition, to demonstrate that their 
education, licences etc. should be recognised as well 
(Article VII:2).
These provisions have rarely been used, however. 
Between January 1995 and April 2005, no more than 
44 notiﬁ cations under Article VII:4 were submitted, 
8 For example, the existing EC commitments on health services under 
the GATS could imply that current Commission proposals aimed at 
facilitating the mobility of patients between the MS, including through 
streamlined reimbursement procedures for health care costs, are ap-
plicable as well to patients seeking treatment in third countries. (All 
MS, except Finland and Sweden, have undertaken full national-treat-
ment commitments on consumption abroad for hospital services and, 
except Finland, for medical and dental services.) The Commission’s 
explanation of the proposed Services Directive – “... is an internal 
market instrument and therefore concerns only service providers 
established in a Member State ...” – may thus need to be qualiﬁ ed. 
The actual impact of the Communities’ commitments may depend, 
nevertheless, on whether the relevant foreign-established facilities 
and their staff provide “like services” and are recognised to meet rel-
evant EC qualiﬁ cation requirements and standards. See Commission 
of the European Communities: Proposal for a Directive of the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Council on services in the internal market, 
COM(2004)2ﬁ nal/3, Brussels 2004, p. 15.
9 The overview was prepared by the OECD Secretariat on the basis 
of an informal document by the WTO Secretariat. See OECD: Trade 
in Services:  A Roadmap to GATS MFN Exemptions, Working Party 
of the Trade Committee (TD/TC/WP(2001)25/FINAL), Paris 2001.  The 
EC is counted as one entity.  
10 Examples include not only traditional arrangements favouring 
citizens of Commonwealth, Francophone and Portuguese-speaking 
countries (UK, France and Portugal), but also reciprocity requirements 
vis-à-vis third countries (Austria: access of ﬁ nancial service suppliers; 
Finland and Sweden: maritime cabotage; France: capital participa-
tion in news agency services and access to press agency services; 
Germany: chartering of foreign ships; Italy: purchase of real estate as 
well as capital participation in broadcasting and publishing services; 
Spain: establishment of commercial presence in road transport ser-
vices).
11 K. N i c o l a ï d i s , J. P. Tr a c h t m a n : From Policed Regulation to 
Managed Recognition in GATS; in: P. S a u v é , R. M. S t e r n  (eds.): 
GATS 2000 – New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization, Wash-
ington DC 2000, Center for Business and Government, Harvard Uni-
versity and Brookings Institution Press, pp. 241-282.
Table 1
Commitments by Country Group, March 2005
1 Transition economies only.
Total number of sub-sectors: ~160; total number of Members: 148, 
including the EC MS.
WTO Members Average number of 
sub-sectors commit-
ted per Member
Range
(lowest/highest number of 
scheduled sub-sectors)
Least-developed 
economies
24 1 – 111
Developing & tran-
sition economies
52  (104)1 1 – 147  (58 - 147)1
Developed 
economies
105 86 – 115
Accessions 
since 1995
102 37 – 147
ALL MEMBERS 50 1 – 147
FORUM
Intereconomics, May/June 2005138
covering some 125 agreements or measures, about 
two-thirds of which relate to “old” agreements predat-
ing the GATS or the relevant dates of accession. 
Most participants in integration agreements, includ-
ing the EC and the other signatories to the Europe 
Agreements and the Agreement on the European Eco-
nomic Area, seemingly hold the view that recognition 
measures among participants are covered by Article 
V on Economic Integration, rather than Article VII.12 
(The only notiﬁ cation made by the EC under the latter 
provisions dates from 1997 and relates to an agree-
ment with Switzerland on direct insurance.) This inter-
pretation seems to offer at least two “advantages”: no 
obligation to afford third countries an opportunity to 
negotiate participation, and no automatic extension 
of the relevant beneﬁ ts to third-country nationals that 
have been licensed by institutions within the integra-
tion area. Members of integration agreements are 
required, pursuant to Article V:6, to extend the relevant 
beneﬁ ts, possibly including recognition measures, to 
any juridical person constituted under the laws of a 
party to the agreement that is engaged in substantial 
business operations in the integration area. However, 
there are no equivalent provisions applying to third-
country nationals. In other words, while any company 
licensed to supply services in Norway, whether na-
tional- or foreign-owned, may enjoy the same regu-
latory status in Germany, third-country professionals 
licensed as doctors, architects etc. in Norway would 
not need to be recognised by German regulators on a 
par with their Norwegian colleagues. Moreover, con-
cerning the recognition of diplomas within the EC, the 
Communities’ schedule contains a national treatment 
limitation under mode 4 that explicitly excludes na-
tionals of third countries from the scope of relevant EC 
Directives. The initial offer submitted by the Communi-
ties in the ongoing round does not provide for change.
Diversity of Access Conditions across Sectors and 
Modes of Supply
Given the broad spectrum of services transactions 
and, even more so, permissible trade barriers falling 
under the GATS, it is far more difﬁ cult than in merchan-
dise trade to provide a reasonably accurate picture 
of the access obligations undertaken by individual 
WTO Members. The number of sectors inscribed in 
schedules – regardless of their economic importance 
and the existence of limitations – may, nevertheless, 
provide a cursory indication of Members’ propensity 
to bind access conditions in services. Table 1 sug-
gests a relatively clear relationship with the level of 
development, despite wide variations within individual 
country groups. With the exception of post-Uruguay 
Round accession cases, developing countries have, 
on average, scheduled far fewer sectors than devel-
oped Members as a group, thus apparently availing 
themselves of the ﬂ exibility afforded by the architec-
ture of the Agreement which, in turn, is also reiterated 
in various development-related provisions (Articles IV 
and XIX:2).
A comparison across the large service sectors 
shows, not surprisingly, that tourism has drawn the 
highest number of commitments. Given the tradition-
ally open regimes in many countries, the sector is an 
obvious candidate for speciﬁ c commitments. Apart 
from tourism, current schedules are largely dominated 
by producer-related services, i.e. services that per-
N o t e : The vertical axis displays the number of WTO Members that 
have scheduled at least one sub-sector out of the 14 sectors, from 
business services to other transport (mainly road and rail transport), 
listed on the horizontal axis. The numbers at the top of each bar 
indicate the percentage of Members with commitments in the area 
concerned. EC MS are counted individually. 
S o u rc e : R. A d l u n g , M. R o y : Turning Hills into Mountains? Current 
Commitments under the GATS and Prospects for Change, WTO Staff 
Working Paper (ERSD-2005-01), Geneva 2005.
Figure 1
Sector Focus of Current Commitments under the 
GATS, March 2005 (in %)
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12 By end-April 2005, there was only one notiﬁ cation under Article V:
7(a), from Australia and New Zealand, that had been submitted “also 
in recognition of any notiﬁ cation requirements under Article VII:4” 
(WTO document S/C/N/66 of 21 October 1997). For a brief discussion 
of the relationship between the two Articles and for further references 
see OECD: Service Providers on the Move: Mutual Recognition Agree-
ments, Working Party of the Trade Committee (TD/TC/WP(2002)48/FI-
NAL), Paris 2003.
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form infrastructural functions such as a broad array of 
business services, telecommunications and ﬁ nancial 
services. In contrast, the health and education sectors 
have apparently proved far less popular. While the sec-
tor pattern displayed in Figure 1 essentially reﬂ ects the 
scheduling decisions of developing countries, which 
account for some 80 per cent of the WTO member-
ship, the latter two services also have been shunned 
completely by several developed economies.13 Among 
the eight developed WTO Members that have not 
scheduled any health-related and social services are 
two EC MS, Finland and Sweden. Also, Sweden is one 
of the four WTO Members that have not committed 
any educational service. The Communities’ initial offer 
in the ongoing negotiations, consolidating for the ﬁ rst 
time all 25 MS in one schedule, does not foresee any 
changes in this regard.
The diversity of access conditions – or, at least, of 
bound levels of access – across sectors is reﬂ ected 
in a similar diversity across modes. Commitments 
on consumption abroad (mode 2) tend to be the 
most liberal: on average for all WTO Members, about 
one-half of the relevant entries for both market ac-
cess and national treatment do not carry any limita-
tions.14 Commercial presence (mode 3) is the most 
economically important mode of supply, representing 
some 50 per cent of all trade falling under the GATS. 
About four-ﬁ fths of all entries under this mode guar-
antee some degree of access, subject to various 
limitations. In contrast, virtually all commitments on 
mode 4, presence of natural persons, are very tightly 
circumscribed. Starting from an “unbound”, most 
WTO Members have scheduled undertakings with 
regard to a limited number of categories, normally 
higher-level employees or intra-corporate transfer-
ees, which are permitted access for limited periods of 
stay. Even these undertakings are frequently subject 
to tight numerical ceilings or discretionary economic 
needs tests. The EC’s initial offer contains certain 
improvements for this mode, including the abolition 
of economic needs tests. However, as in the case of 
virtually all other WTO Members, the focus remains on 
relatively skilled professionals that are sent from, or 
transferred by, companies established abroad. In any 
15 See footnote 9.
event, given the scope of the offer, deeper integration 
moves within the EC, as envisaged under the heavily 
discussed Services Directive, are unlikely to beneﬁ t 
third-country nationals.
Outlook: Don’t Wait for “Geneva”
Given the absence of tightly binding (and biting) 
obligations, the economic implications of the GATS 
are likely to differ from those of the GATT. Protec-
tion-seekers will ﬁ nd it easier to defy broad-based 
liberalisation and survive in niches, and the scope for 
reciprocal exchanges, in which export interests might 
be mobilised to overcome resistance, is far more lim-
ited than in merchandise trade. What common yard-
stick could be used to measure and compare, across 
sectors and modes, the interventions of country B with 
those of A?
Nevertheless, the prospects are not equally bleak 
in all sectors. There are circumstances where services 
liberalisation has proven virtually irresistible. Technical 
progress, not least the ascent of new communication 
technologies, has created new alternatives to long 
entrenched regimes or rendered them unenforce-
able. Telecom reform, to an extent, consisted of many 
governments, including in the EC, recognising and 
adjusting to what was happening in reality. And there 
has been less internal resistance to change in such 
rapidly expanding sectors than in agriculture, steel 
or mining, where speciﬁ c skills and expertise may be 
lost for good. In these circumstances, the ongoing 
ser vices round can be expected to help to acceler-
ate and, within limits, modify reform projects that are 
already under consideration and, on entry into force, 
protect the new regimes from reversals. From that 
perspective, presupposing a continued commitment 
to ser vices liberalisation and harmonisation, the EC 
– and its trading partners – stand to be among the 
main beneﬁ ciaries. The same applies, in principle, to 
EC-internal moves aimed at deepening integration in 
sectors and modes that are covered by current com-
mitments. (Mode 4 may prove a special case, howev-
er.) The national treatment rule, wherever applicable, 
should ensure that internal reforms also beneﬁ t foreign 
companies established within the EC and, depend-
ing on the circumstances, suppliers competing from 
abroad under modes 1 and 2.15
The initial momentum, however, would need to 
come from “Brussels”.
13 Among developed countries, only “Other communication services” 
have proven less popular.  They consist of postal, courier and au-
diovisual services. Maritime services are a special case insofar as the 
negotiations were not completed at the time, but suspended until the 
current round.
14 R. A d l u n g , M. R o y : Turning Hills into Mountains? Current Com-
mitments under the GATS and Prospects for Change, WTO Staff 
Working Paper (ERSD-2005-01), Geneva 2005. 
